It is high time to delve into the work of Colonel and Professor Sergei Komov, a Soviet and later Russian theorist who stands as one of the most influential figures in the realm of Information Warfare. The reason for focusing on Komov is clear: despite his significant contributions, he remains relatively unknown, particularly among French-speaking experts.

Komov has authored several articles on Information Warfare, or what he terms the “Information Struggle.” Today, we explore two of his pieces published in the Russian journal Voyennaia mysl (Military Thought) during the 1990s. While the earliest article I could locate was published in 1994, it is his 1996 article titled “The Information Struggle in Modern Warfare: Theoretical Problems” that truly captured my attention.

One aspect that particularly strikes me is Russia’s capacity to engage with strategic issues even during periods of profound national uncertainty. Komov developed his theories amidst a tumultuous era for his country, characterized by economic upheaval and doubts about the Russian Federation’s territorial integrity. This period was marked by the Chechen wars, secessionist movements, economic hardships, and political instability.

From the outset of his 1996 article, Komov underscores the escalating importance of information in military operations. While he primarily discusses Information Warfare within the framework of conventional warfare and military engagements, he does not dismiss its relevance in economic, diplomatic, ideological, or even geopolitical contexts.

He identifies three main components of Information Warfare (see schema below):

• Information Support involves gathering, processing, and exchanging accurate and reliable information about the enemy and one’s own troops to support combat operations.
• Information Countermeasures focus on disrupting the enemy’s ability to gather, process, and exchange information, and introducing deception and disinformation to hinder their management capabilities.
• Information Protection involves safeguarding against enemy disinformation and ensuring that necessary information remains accessible, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of information support under conditions of the enemy’s information countermeasures.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that the primary objective of Information Warfare, within the context of conventional conflict, is to attain informational superiority over the adversary. As early as 1996, Komov proposed that the Information Struggle would evolve into an independent facet of warfare, applicable across economic, diplomatic, ideological, and other domains. He further emphasized that information warfare operates at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is important also to mention here that Information Warfare is perpetual, occurring in both wartime and peacetime, unlike conventional warfare.

Colonel Komov observes that the adversary may not always recognize when Information Warfare is being deployed against them. He underscores the importance of achieving informational superiority to gain an edge in other warfare domains, such as air, land, and sea, with “cyber” being a critical addition in the Western approach.

In a subsequent article published a year later, titled “Ways of Conducting Information Warfare”, Colonel Sergei Komov further develops his conceptualization of information warfare. While his primary focus is on its measures as tools for securing and maintaining superiority over an adversary during both preparations and active hostilities, his insights provide a comprehensive view of this evolving field.

Komov categorizes the means of information warfare into three main types:

1. The category of “force” – involves the destruction of information systems using weapons.
2. The intellectual category – centers around reflexive control of the adversary.
3. The combined category – ensures superiority by leveraging both previous categories simultaneously.

Additionally, he draws parallels between kinetic warfare and information warfare, emphasizing that both can be employed in offensive and defensive capacities. Offensive methods include: blocking information, distraction, immobilization, exhaustion, staging, disintegration (splitting), pacification, intimidation, provocation, overload, inculcation, and pressure. While defensive Information Warfare consists of only two methods: unblocking and juxtaposition.

In my opinion, among the offensive strategies, three stand out as particularly important:

• The disintegration (splitting) method is predominantly used in diplomacy, this method aims to sow discord within an adversary’s coalition. By spreading misinformation, it manipulates public opinion and creates a false perception of the political and military situation among key decision-makers. Additionally, it seeks to exacerbate existing or artificially created divisions within the “enemy camp”, weakening the adversary’s military and economic power.
• The overload method is employed during the preparatory phase and active hostilities. It involves bombarding the enemy with a vast amount of contradictory information to overload their decision-making system. The resulting uncertainty forces the adversary into making poor or delayed decisions, thereby destabilizing their strategic planning.
• The pressure method involve disseminating defamatory or destabilizing information about the enemy. This strategy seeks to influence domestic and international organizations, associations, and even intergovernmental bodies to act against the adversary’s political leadership. By leveraging traditional media, social networks, and propaganda, these efforts aim to turn a country’s population against its government, complicating public policy implementation, reforms, or military operations.

According to Colonel Komov, Information Warfare can be conducted in four primary forms:: informational impact, informational attack, information battle, and information operation.

In summary, Colonel Komov’s writings from the 1990s illustrate a dual perspective within the Russian leadership: a recognition of their conventional military and economic inferiority relative to Western nations, and a strategic effort to develop alternative “hybrid” forms of warfare that could provide a competitive advantage or at least mitigate these shortcomings.

While Komov’s work serves as a theoretical foundation for information warfare, the concept has since undergone significant adaptation to modern technological advancements, evolving into a predominantly non-military instrument of influence and strategic competition.

NB. Sergei Komov speaks of “informatsionnaya borba” (information struggle) – a term that can also be equated and commonly translated as “Information Warfare”.